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1. Introduction 
Civilian nuclear power reactors are either fuelled with low-enriched uranium ( 5% 235U) or, to a much lesser extent, 
uranium-plutonium mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. An alternative fuelling scheme is to use thorium, which naturally contains 
>99.99% of fertile 232Th. On capturing a neutron, 233Th undergoes subsequent β– decays to 233U. 233U can undergo fission 
on capturing a neutron of any energy. An overview of the potential thorium-based fuel-cycles and its impact over the 
whole nuclear fuel cycle can be found in a recent IAEA Technical Document.[1] In terms of proliferation resistance, 
proponents of thorium-based fuel cycles mention that much less plutonium is produced and the plutonium generated 
has a larger component of heat-generating 238Pu.[2,3] Furthermore, a small amount of short-lived 232U is generated and 
from subsequent decays from this nuclide, a 2.6 MeV γ ray is emitted. For trace contaminations (~1 μg), the resultant 
whole-body dose is of the order of millisieverts at a distance of 1 metre which would make the spent fuel highly 
radiotoxic and difficult to reprocess.[4] The main counterpoint to this is that 233U, produced in such a nuclear energy 
system, is a specific nuclear material with a bare critical mass of 15.5 kg, which is comparable to that of 239Pu (10.2 
kg).[5] Under IAEA Safeguards Agreements, pure 233U is treated identically to plutonium (i.e. a significant quantity is 
defined as 8 kg and amounts over 2 kg are treated as Category I materials).[6-8] Also, for uranium-thorium fuels in 
existing nuclear energy systems, as thorium is fertile (and hence absorbs neutrons), higher concentrations of 235U are 
needed to maintain criticality at the start of the fuel cycle.  
 
This paper will highlight the historical and potential future uses of 232Th and 233U both in terms of civil and military 
applications. A brief section on the differences between 233U and 239Pu will be presented and how these could impact 
proliferation-resistance assessments. Finally, a set of open questions regarding 233U will be presented, some of which 
will be answered as part of this research project. 
 
2. Civilian Nuclear Fuel Applications of 232Th and 233U 
Currently, thorium has little commercial application and as such is mainly treated as a waste by-product from rare-earth 
element mining.[9] Given its abundance, which due to its longer half-life is expected to be three times greater than that 
of uranium (> 57 MT compared with 19.2 MT), it has been touted as a potential future nuclear fuel. It should be noted 
that currently only 6.5–7.4 MT of thorium has been identified so far, compared with 5.4 MT of reasonably-assured 
uranium reserves.[10,11] However, data on thorium reserves has not been published for a number of countries, most 
notably China. 
 
In terms of civil nuclear applications, thorium dioxide (ThO2)
 has been used in a number of research, prototype and 
commercial reactors. For light water reactors (LWRs), the Shippingport Nuclear Reactor in the USA operated for 29,000 
effective full power hours from 1977 to 1982 with a core consisting of ceramic thorium-uranium fuel containing 1–5% 
uranium (enriched to 98% 233U).[12] Since this reactor’s operation, modifications to the Rosatom-designed 1000 MWe 
VVER-1000 have been proposed to incorporate low-enriched uranium (containing 20% 235U) and thorium.[13] This core 
design is referred to as the VVER-T.[14] Similarly, researchers at MIT have investigated two different strategies of 
fuelling a Westinghouse PWR with low-enriched uranium (also containing 20% 235U) and thorium.[15] Significant 
research into thorium-based fuels for LWRs is currently being undertaken by ThorEnergy and also LightBridge.[16,17] 
 
High-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) can also use thorium, either in prismatic blocks or as a bed of pebbles. A 
number of test reactors were built and operated with Th-LEU fuel between the 1960s and 1980s including Peach 
Bottom, USA (1967–1974), Dragon at Winfrith, UK (1964–1975) and AVR in Germany (1968–1988).[18,19,20] Two 
demonstration commercial reactors were built thereafter. First, a 330 MWe prismatic HTGR was built at Fort St Vrain, 
Colorado, USA and a 300 MWe pebble-bed modular reactor was built in Hamm-Uentrop, Germany.[21,20] Both reactors 
experienced numerous difficulties and were closed prematurely, although these closures were not due to failures or 
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shortcomings in the thorium-fuel components of the programmes. The Very High Temperature Reactor concept, an 
evolution of such high-temperature reactors, is one of six potential nuclear energy systems suggested as part of the 
Generation IV International Forum.[22] 
 
In the near-term, India is hoping to use thorium in the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR).[23] These reactors 
would form the third stage of India’s three-stage nuclear energy program.[24] It is envisaged that these reactors would 
operate in a closed fuel cycle and use reprocessed 233U and a small component of 239Pu in the central seed region of the 
fuel cluster (near equivalent to a fuel assembly in a PWR), with fertile 232Th forming the outer blanket region of the fuel 
cluster. A modification of the core layout is being investigated to allow such a reactor to operate with low-enriched 
uranium and thorium.[25] Also, it is envisaged that blankets of 232Th will be placed in Indian-designed, sodium-cooled 
fast breeder reactors to breed extra 233U required for AHWRs.[26] On a separate note, India has already utilised 600g of 
233U, alloyed with aluminium, to form the core of the 30 kW KAMINI research reactor at the Indira Gandhi Centre for 
Atomic Research, Kalpakkam, India.[27] 
 
Another two potential nuclear energy systems that could make use of thorium are molten salt breeder reactors (MSBRs) 
and accelerator driven sub-critical reactors (ADSRs). Development of MSBRs is underway in the USA, China and Japan. 
These reactors would be based on developing and up-scaling the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment that operated at Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory from 1965 to 1969.[28] Although there are ambitious research programs under development 
for such reactors, various technical challenges still need to be overcome.[29] Research and development of ADSRs is 
ongoing in the UK, USA, Europe, China and India.[30] It should be noted that significant improvements in the reliability 
of current accelerator technology are needed.[31] For both technologies, it is expected that closed fuel cycles would 
pertain.[32] 
 
Other countries that have shown an interest in thorium include Norway, which recently completed an appraisal of 
thorium and its potential to be indigenously adopted.[33] Norway has an estimated 170,000 tonnes mainly contained in 
hard-rock formations. The 2008 report gives no final assessment into the ability for thorium-based energy generation to 
be deployed but recommends that it should be maintained as an open option. In the UK, The Weinberg Foundation, a 
not-for-profit, non-governmental organisation, was launched in 2011 to promote thorium as a future nuclear fuel.[34] 
Although such a foundation is geared towards being technology-independent, particular support has initially been made 
towards molten salt reactor concepts. In 2012, an All-Party Parliamentary Group on thorium energy has been launched 
that will look at the potential benefits of the fuel and reactor technologies.[35] Separately, the UK National Nuclear 
Laboratory recently issued a position paper on thorium which states that ‘the thorium fuel cycle does not currently have 
a role to play in the UK context, other than its potential application for plutonium management in the longer term’, 
although it supports future research and development on this fuel cycle.[36] In recent years, the UK National Nuclear 
Laboratory has been involved in European-based research programmes on thorium-based fuels.[37] 
 
3. Military Applications of 233U 
Although the majority of research relating to fission devices since the Second World War has focused on utilising 
plutonium, some research has also been performed on 233U. Two particular references in open literature will be 
presented below, although in no sense should this be taken as an exhaustive representation of the subject. 
 
First, from Hansen’s book U.S. Nuclear Weapons, as part of its development of artillery-fired atomic projectiles, the US 
started development of an 8-inch shell (the MK 33) in 1952.[38] Hansen notes ‘requirements for nuclear materials … 
included the request for construction of equipment and facilities for producing uranium-233 for use as a nuclear 
explosive in the new shell’. ‘In late February 1953, results of tests at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (now Los Alamos 
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National Laboratory), indicated that U-233 would not be a satisfactory nuclear explosive and the Army changed its 
requirements to use uranium-235 as the nuclear fuel for the 8-in shell’.[39] 
 
Second, from the Nuclear Weapon Archive website, it is mentioned that Shot MET (‘Military Effects Tests’), part of 
Operation Teapot, comprised of a Pu/233U core.[40]  The purpose of this Shot was ‘(1) To study the effects on military 
equipment, and (2) To allow Department of Defense personnel to observe a nuclear detonation’.[41] The delivered 
payload from this Shot was 22 kT, though the predicted yield was suggested to be 33 kT.[40] Given that Ref. [40] does 
not reference the origin of the data, the original source material would need to be identified and reported to provide 
extra credibility. What appears surprising is that in comparing the material properties of 233U to 235U and 239Pu, 233U 
could potentially be more advantageous. 
 
4. Material Properties of 233U Compared to 235U and 239Pu 
The material properties of 233U, pertinent to weapons-usability, have been previous ascertained and compiled by C.W. 
Forsberg et al.[42] These centre on the mass, isotopic mix, heat and radiotoxicity of the material. As mentioned in the 
introduction, 233U is a specific nuclear material of which a significant quantity, defined as the ‘the approximate amount 
of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded’, is defined 
to be 8 kg.[7] This is compared with 8 kg for mixed plutonium (with the exception of plutonium containing more than 
80% 238Pu which is exempt from safeguards). An estimate of the bare critical mass for 233U is 15.5 kg.[5] 
 
In terms of physical protection categorisation, as outlined in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, the above compilation of weapons-
usable material properties suggests that 233U denatured with 238U should have an equivalent categorisation to that of 
denatured 235U.[43] The suggested categorisation and amendments (shown in italics) to INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 are 
presented in Table 1. The most recent guidance from the IAEA, INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 published in 2011, still maintains the 
same categorisation as the third revision.[8] 
 
Table 1: Material Definitions for Safeguarding Unirradiated Pu, 235U and 233U 
   Category  
Material Form I II III 
Pu Any material form, with exception of 
plutonium containing  80% 238Pu 
 2 kg  2 kg, 
but  0.5 kg 
 500 g, 
but  15 g 
235U U enriched to  20% 235U   5 kg  5 kg, 
but  1kg 
 1 kg, 
but  15 g 
 U enriched to  10% 235U, but  20%   10 kg  10 kg 
 U enriched above natural, but < 10%    10 kg 
233U Any material form  2 kg  2 kg, 
but  0.5 kg 
  500g, 
but  15 g 
 U with  12% 233U  2 kg  2 kg, 
but  0.5 kg 
  500g, 
but  15 g 
 U with  12% 233U, but  6%   4 kg  4 kg 
 U with  6% 233U, but  0.66%    4 kg 
 
In terms of the isotopic mix of uranium, currently ‘Weapons Grade’ uranium is associated with having a 235U content of 
greater than 94%[44] and non-weaponisable uranium has a 235U content  20%.[13] However, with the introduction of 
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fissile 233U and fertile/poisonous 232,234,236U, an equivalent classification scheme to that of plutonium (as reported in Ref. 
[44]) would need to be formulated. 
 
For plutonium isotopes, 239Pu is the main fissile isotope. 240Pu acts as a ‘poison’ (i.e. absorbs rather than generating 
neutrons) and has a sizable spontaneous fission component which can cause pre-detonation of a nuclear device.[45] 
This is the main reason why plutonium is used solely in implosion devices. 238Pu has a relatively short half-life (T½ = 87.7 
years) and undergoes a series of α decays to 206Pb which provides a large amount of decay heat. This decay heat can 
potentially cause degradation of the explosive charge.[44] 241Pu, although fissile, can undergo β– decay into 241Am which 
can significantly poison a system. 
 
For uranium isotopes, both 233U and 235U are fissile with differing bare critical masses. 236,238U both act as neutron 
poisons. 234U is also a poison but has a smaller spontaneous fission component compared to 238Pu. 232U has a 
comparably short half-life (T½ = 68.9 years) and undergoes a similar series of α decays to 
208Pb. Compared to 238Pu it 
provides a sizable decay heat, but from the β– decay of 208Tl into 208Pb, a 2.6 MeV γ ray is emitted which is difficult to 
shield. 
   
This radiotoxic 232U component can be formed by the 233U(n,2n) reaction and can potentially make the handling and 
reprocessing of 233U a significant challenge. The work of Kang and von Hippel looks at the radiotoxicity of spent fuel 
from current nuclear energy technologies.[46] It is noted that for very high burn-up fuels (e.g. PWR fuel with a discharge 
burn-up of 70 GWd/t, compared to a typical average burn-up of 45–50 GWd/t), the resultant radiotoxicity of 5 kg of 
bare uranium metal, with an assumed 232U component of 0.001% is 130 mSv/hr at 0.5 metre, after a decay time of 1 
year. However, the build-up of 232U can be mitigated by employing low burn-up fuel cycles, using segregated/targeted 
thorium channels and with swift reprocessing. The take-home message from the work of Kang and von Hippel is that 
‘the proliferation resistance of thorium fuel cycles depends very much upon how they are implemented’. 
 
5. Open Questions Regarding the Proliferation-Resistance of Thorium-Uranium Civil Nuclear Fuel 
1.  What reasons led the US to stop pursuing 233U for weapons purposes and would developments since 1955 make 233U 
a concern? 
2.  What is the Definition Weapons Grade Uranium vector inclusive of 232U and 233U (compared with J. Carson Mark’s 
report)? 
3.  Would thorium-uranium systems provide additional pathways to obtaining specific and alternative nuclear 
materials? 
4.  Is 20% low-enriched uranium (although not weaponisable) a sensible upper limit for uranium enrichment, assuming 
particular diversion routes? If it is not suitable, what impact would this have on thorium-uranium systems? 
5.  Similarly, what impact would alternative enrichment technologies (electromagnetic/atomic vapour laser isotope 
separation) have on the definition of low-enriched uranium? 
6.  Would thorium-uranium systems be more difficult to safeguard (particularly in terms of material accountability)? 
  
6. Conclusion 
Thorium has the potential to be implemented in existing and future novel nuclear energy systems. However, as 233U is 
formed in such systems and is a specific nuclear material near equivalent to plutonium, thorium fuel is of legitimate 
concern in terms of its proliferation resistance. In this work, we consider thorium-uranium fuels in civil nuclear power 
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7. Terminology 
α decay: Transmutation of an unstable heavy nucleus into a lighter nucleus by emission of a 4He nucleus (α particle). 
β¯ decay: Transmutation of an unstable nucleus with excessive number of neutrons, by conversion of one of its 
neutrons into a proton, emitting an electron (β¯ particle) and anti-electron neutrino. 
γ ray: Electromagnetic radiation emitted from a nucleus with excess internal energy.  For nuclear energy systems, this is 
typically subsequent from β¯ decay. 
Bare critical mass: Mass of fissile material needed (without any reflectors or tampers, hence ‘bare’) for a sustained 
chain-reaction to take place.  
Burn-up: Energy output from nuclear fission per unit mass of initial nuclear fuel. 
Criticality: The ability for a chain-reaction to occur.  A critical system has an output to input neutron ratio of 1.  If ratio is 
greater than 1, it is super-critical.  If ratio is less than 1, it is sub-critical.   
Decay heat: The heat released from radioactive decay. 
Fertile: Ability for a nucleus, on absorbing a neutron, to transmute into a fissile nucleus. Main fertile isotopes include 
232Th and 238U. 
(n,2n) reaction: Nuclear reaction involving energetic ‘fast’ neutrons, where an incident neutron impinges on a target 
nucleus and two neutrons are emitted. Converts fissile 233U and 239Pu into undesirable 232U and 238Pu.    
Pebble-bed: Fuel form consisting of layers of thorium dioxide, uranium dioxide and graphite, moulded into spheres with 
a radius of ~5cm.  
Prismatic: Fuel form consisting of thorium dioxide, uranium dioxide and graphite in microspheres, with a radius of 
~0.15–0.3mm, and are embedded into hexagonal shaped compacts which fit into a large graphite block. 
PWR: Pressurised Water Reactor. A light water reactor in which water is maintained at a high enough pressure to 
prevent boiling. 
Spontaneous fission: Ability of a nucleus to undergo fission spontaneously without the need for a neutron.  
VVER: Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reactor, Russian-designed variant of the Pressurised Water Reactor. 
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